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Currently, public innovation is moving to the top of the agenda among decision makers in many 
Western liberal democracies, and the image of the public sector as intrinsically non-innovative 
(Downs, 1967) has gradually lost its grip. The belief in the possibility of enhancing public 
innovation was first voiced in the New Public Management (NPM) reform program of the 1980s 
and 90s (Hood, 1991), and with increasing force in the New Public Governance (NPG) reforms of 
the late 90s and 00s (Osborne, 2010). These reform programs have mostly focussed on how to 
innovate public services, however, while little attention is given to the question of how the public 
sector can enhance its capacity for policy innovation. The limited focus on policy innovation is 
problematic, not least in light of the growing distrust in politicians and disenchantment of 
democracy in many Western liberal democracies (Stoker, 2006; Norris, 2011). Enhancing the 
capacity of elected politicians to develop new policies that are able to solve problems that citizens 
perceive as important could contribute to solving this crisis for democracy.  
 
This article takes its departure in the view that a comprehensive theory of public sector innovation 
must include a definition of policy innovation, considerations about how it can be enhanced, and 
thoughts on what barriers that must be overcome in promoting policy innovation. The aim of the 
article is to analyse the conditions for policy innovation in contemporary representative 
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democracies. I start out by defining policy innovation and other related innovations in political life. 
Then follow a discussion of how political leadership, competition and collaboration can function as 
drivers of policy innovation and a description of barriers to policy innovation in traditional models 
of representative democracy. I move on to analyse two Danish case studies of recent experiments 
with policy innovation that seeks to enhance the space for collaboration between politicians and 
stakeholders, and the article concludes by identifying some of the challenges that face politicians 
and other actors who seek to improve the policy innovation capacity of representative democracy.  
 
 
Policy innovation and other related innovations in political life 
Although there are many competing definitions of innovations they generally agree that innovation 
involves the creation and realization of new ideas). Following Lawrence Green, et al, (2002, 9) 
innovation involves “doing something new i.e. introducing a new practice or process, creating a 
new product (good or service), or adopting a new pattern of intra- or inter-organizational 
relationship”. Innovations can be new products but they can also be new organizational forms and 
procedures or new cultural images and role perceptions. Whether or not innovations provide added 
value, this is in the end always a matter of taste (Hartley, 2005). Therefore, it would be flawed to 
use the term ‘innovation’ as a normative qualifier for something good or beneficial. It is a 
descriptive term for a particular kind of change that can be evaluated positively or negatively by the 
involved parties. In this article, I aim to describe the ability of elected politicians in representative 
democracies to innovate policies and other aspects of political life. The normative underpinning of 
this research descriptive endeavour is the view that the future of representative democracy depends 
on its ability to accommodate the continuous production of political answers to emerging 




It should be noted that innovative changes in political life as well as in other phenomena are 
disruptive as well as productive. They produce something new but by doing so they undermine 
existing practices and common wisdoms (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011). As such, innovations create 
discontinuity in the form of creative disruptions of a phenomenon and are therefore distinct from 
changes that merely alter the quality or quantity of a given phenomenon (Osborne and Brown, 
2005). Innovative changes can be either small and incremental or large and radical, but what unites 
them is that they involve the development and realization of new things, practices and perceptions 
that somehow break with the past. But what does it mean for something to be new? Innovation 
theory stresses that although innovations are sometimes based on the invention of something 
entirely new, they are more often the result of a pragmatic recombination of old and new elements, 
and imitation of innovative solutions from elsewhere through a process of adoption and adaptation 
(Rogers, 1995).  
 
Seen through the lens of innovation theory, public innovation involves the development of new 
products in the form of new policies and services as well as new ways of organizing political life 
and public service provision, and new perceptions of what is normal and accepted behaviour among 
politicians, public employees and users of public services. These innovations are outcomes of 
processes of creative destruction of the given and an inventive combination and adaption of new 
and old elements of public governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2011). As evidenced by a number of 
studies, innovations in governance tend to be interrelated and one kind of innovation is often 
followed by others trigger another kind of innovation (Roberts and Bradley, 1991; Ansell and 
Torfing, 2014). Hence, organizational and procedural innovations often trigger product innovations 
and changes in the role images of the involved actors and vice versa. Therefore an analysis of policy 
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innovation must include a larger analysis of innovations in political life defined as the 
interrelatedness between policy innovation and innovations in the formal and informal institutional 
rules and norms through which these policies are produced as well the cultural images and role 
perceptions attached to these rules and norms. The three interrelated aspects of political life that can 
be made subject to innovation are listed in table 1 and elaborated in the following sections.   
 
Policy innovation Organizational and 
procedural innovation 
Cultural innovation 
Policy with new content or 
presented in new format 
New formal and informal 
institutional rules and norms  
New images and role 
perceptions  




A policy innovation provides changes in the content or form of a policy (Polsby, 1984). The content 
of a policy is innovative to the extent that it offers a new definition of a political problem, provides 
a new political vision for the political community, and/or proposes a new set of political goals and 
strategies. Since policy innovation involves a high degree of normative contestation and positioning 
between actors with different perspectives, ideas, views and interests, political innovations 
processes tends to be ridden by conflicts. Conflicts are particularly likely in the case of policy 
innovations that challenge existing hegemonic political positions or address heavily politicized 
policy issues (Howarth and Torfing, 2005). Cases in point are new policy initiatives in the area of 
gun control in the US, and integration reforms in the Netherlands. In less conflict ridden policy 
5 
 
areas, policy innovations can pass smoothly through the political process. As pointed out by John 
W. Kingdon (1984), however, it is not always predictable whether or not a policy innovation will 
meet resistance or travel quietly through the political process. The faith of a new policy depends to 
a considerable degree on whether or not a strong political entrepreneur or leader is able to identify 
and exploit a window of opportunity through skilful timing and alliance building. The same 
observation is made by Nancy C. Roberts and Paula J. King (1996) in their seminal book on policy 
transformation where they stress the importance of strategic political leadership for overcoming 
political resistance against new innovative policy contents as well as for creating support and 
ownership among political key actors.     
   
Policy innovation does not only involve the development of new policy contents, however. The 
format of a policy can be innovated too. The format given to a policy is determined by habit as well 
as by its function in the governance process. Traditionally, policies have mainly taken the form of 
laws and regulatory documents formulated in a complex, formal, technocratic and codified language 
that was well suited for public professionals but not for lay people. However, as political authorities 
increasingly seek to mobilize a wide variety of social actors in solving governance tasks, there is a 
growing need for policy formats that reach a wider audience. Policies aiming to promote healthy 
living must be communicated to those citizens who need to change their way of living, and in the 
case of crime prevention target audiences are often local communities who can assist in creating 
safe environments and other local actors who are in in a position where they can help those who are 
about to choose a bad route in life. In those and other policy areas the impact of a policy depends to 
a considerable degree on whether or not it is made subject to public debate in the traditional mass 
media as well as in the new social media. Therefore, it seems relevant for policy makers to develop 
policy formats that fit the emerging forms of political communication better than do the traditional 
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technical codified policy documents that are difficult to grasp by relevant and affected audiences 
(Savigny, 2002). 
 
Organizational and procedural innovation 
Policy innovations can also consist in new ways of organizing and processing policy making 
(Damanpour, 1991). Although political life in Western representative democracies at least formally 
tends to be organized around the same ideal typical organizational principles, there are huge 
variations between countries (Lijphart, 1977). Furthermore informal rules and norms vary between 
countries and over time. These variations are results of small and large changes in the 
organizational set up and procedures for policy making in the individual countries. At the aggregate 
level the institutional changes can be seen as an ongoing multi-directional innovation of 
representative democracy, which is driven by small and large political battles as well by efforts to 
cope with changing societal conditions. The intensity of the innovative endeavours varies over time. 
Periods of relative stability are interrupted by periods of radical change. Recent studies (Borins, 
2014; Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003; Smith, 2009) indicate that we are in a time of change. 
Institutional reforms in the institutional set up of representative democracy are proliferating in many 
Western liberal democracies aiming to overcome growing distrust in politicians and the general 
disenchantment of representative democracy (Stoker, 2006; Norris, 2011). Many of the institutional 
reforms  are introduced at the local levels of governance, examples being deliberative forums in 
Copenhagen, user boards in Chicago and participatory budgeting in Brazil. There are also 
innovations, however, that are directed towards national and transnational levels of governance one 
prominent example being the Open Government reform program in the US (US-Government, 
2012). Although the present climate among political decision makers creates a momentum for 
organizational and procedural innovations, there are path-dependent forces at play in political life 
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that hampers change. Among these forces is a general unwillingness of those in power at a given 
point in time to support institutional changes that will destabilize their position  (Roberts and 
Bradley, 1991; Pierson, 2000). Accordingly, organizational and procedural innovations often result 
in no more than symbolic acts or isolated experiments that do not have a lasting or profound impact 
on the form and function of public policy making.  
 
Cultural innovation  
Finally, policy innovation can take the form of changes in the cultural images and role perceptions 
of political actors. A culture can be defined as a set of tacit norms and guidelines for how to act and 
interact in a certain context (Shein, 1992). These norms and guidelines refer to a more or less 
coherent logic of appropriateness that specifies how an actor can behave and interact in a 
meaningful, normal and legitimate way in specific situations. Drawing on this definition, a political 
culture represents a constellation of role positions that accommodate but also restrict politicians, 
public administrators, citizens, private firms and voluntary organizations in their exercise of 
political agency (Torfing, et al, 2012, 146). Political cultures are highly dynamic and ambiguous, 
that are constantly made subject to innovation. Small scale changes happen all the time as a result of 
ongoing efforts to cope with the internal ambiguities between different rules and norms within any 
given culture (March and Olsen, 1989), and reactions to contextual changes such as adjustments in 
the formal institutional setting or discursive shifts in society e.g. the current decline of trust in 
formal authority (Kramer and Tyler, 1996). Large scale changes in political culture result from 
paradigmatic shifts that combine new and old cultural signifiers and artefacts in creative ways. A 
recent example is the NPM reform program that introduced a new image of the public sector as a 
market for public service provision that included a reinterpretation political role positions: 
politicians was no longer sovereign rulers but a Board of Directors, the bureaucrats became 
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strategic managers, citizens stepped into the role as costumers, and private firms and NGOs became 
public service providers (Torfing et al, 2012). Cultures do not change easily, however, as witnessed 
by the fact that the NPM paradigm has not been able to completely push aside traditional cultural 
images and role perceptions. The routinized practices born out of tradition tend to prevail, and 
people are generally reluctant to reinterpret their perception of what is meaningful, normal and 
acceptable behaviour for themselves and others in a given context. Role images provide a road map 
that reduces complexity and explicates what an actor should do and not do and what they can expect 
from others (Sørensen, 2006). Without this road map the world appears as unsafe and dangerous. 
Therefore, the willingness of actors to engage in cultural innovations depends, among other things, 
on the degree to which a new attractive roadmap is in sight. This also counts for a political culture 
where the willingness of political actors, and not least the politicians, to step into new roles depends 
on whether they can see a new promising future for themselves on the horizon.      
 
 
Three drivers of policy innovation 
As we have seen above, policy innovation is closely related to other innovations in political life. 
Before we look more closely at the interrelatedness between policy innovation and other political 
innovations, I will seek to clarify what counts as key drivers of policy innovation. Drawing on 
policy analysis and innovation theory, it is possible to identify three drivers of policy: leadership, 
competition and collaboration.  
  
Both innovation theory and theories of public policy making points to entrepreneurial leadership as 
innovators (Schumpeter, 1946; Weber, 1947), but a new understanding of the role of leadership in 
promoting innovation is emerging in both disciplines. In innovation theory, the role of business 
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leadership is increasingly seen as that of getting others to innovate (Deschamps, 2008; Bel, 2009), 
and policy analysts such as John W. Kingdon (1984) have pointed out that what political leaders do 
is to set agendas that call for innovation, and to recruit, motivate, steer and support political, 
administrative, professional and social actors who innovate. Drawing on recent literatures four roles 
can be assigned to leaders of  policy innovation (Sørensen, 2006; Ansell and Gash, 2012):  1) the 
convenor who brings selected actors to the table around a specific topic; 2) the facilitator who 
accommodates actors in their efforts to innovate; 3) the catalyst who creates windows of 
opportunity that calls for new initiatives; and 4) the participant that allow leaders to test, develop 
and communicate their ideas and viewpoints in debates with those who innovate in order to become 
wiser and to make sure, that the new innovative policies do not deviate radically from the norms 
and values among those who are to authorize the innovative policy outcomes (Sørensen, 2006).  In 
order to fulfil these roles, however, political leaders need strong bargaining powers and strategic 
skills. They need what Christopher Hood (1986) calls NATO resources referring to Nodality, 
Authority, Treasure and Organization. Moreover, they need the rhetorical skills it takes to legitimize 
the innovations in the eyes of the larger public and to persuade relevant audiences of the potential 
benefits that can be achieved if they are willing to engage in the development of new policies in the 
face of what is at a given point in time perceived as a pressing policy issue also denoted a burning 
platforms (Willner, 1985). An example of how burning platforms can be used to legitimize 
innovation is how politicians in many countries have used the results of the PISA program for 
international student assessment formulated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) to put educational reforms on the political agenda and put pressure on 
relevant actors to suggest appropriate policy solutions. This example also illustrates the point made 
by Robert Tucker (1995) that not only politicians but also other actors, e.g. independent policy 
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agencies such as the OECD, can construct create a window of opportunity for policy innovation 
through the construction of pressing policy problems.      
 
Competition is another important innovation driver celebrated by traditional theories of innovation 
and political science (Schumpeter, 1946; Sartori, 1987). It is a key assumption in innovation theory 
that competition between business firms stimulates the development of new products and 
production methods (Nickell, 1996), and theories of representative democracy view competition 
between politicians on Election Day as an important force behind the formulation of new innovative 
policy programs (Polsby, 1984). Hence, competitive pressures motivate and encourage actors to 
embark on the troublesome, costly and hard journey it is to develop something new. In illustration, 
markets characterized by intense competition are more innovative than markets with limited 
competition (Sharpe and Currie, 2008). For the same reason, the production of new innovative 
political programs is predominantly taking place in political parties that have experienced a drop in 
voter support (Hersey, 2014). Recent developments in innovation theory and theories of public 
governance increasingly note, however, that competition can also hamper innovation because it 
delimits the exchange of knowledge and ideas, prevents resource pooling and increases the risk of 
failure (Teece, 1992; Nambisan, 2008). Competition is therefore increasingly seen as a two edged 
word: it motivates actors to innovate but it hampers their efforts to do so.  
 
Recognizing that neither leadership nor competition is sufficient to ensure innovation has turned the 
focus of attention of those studying private and public innovation towards the question of how 
collaboration can contribute to the promotion of innovation. Theories of private sector innovation 
are increasingly interested in the role of business clusters, and production chain networks for 
promoting innovation (Edquist and Hommen, 1999; Nambisan, 2008). Moreover, there is a growing 
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interest in how collaboration between firms and customers can work together in an attempt to 
develop new innovative products (Von Hippel, 2005). In public innovation research, the New 
Public Governance (NPG) (Osborne, 2010) paradigm views collaboration as an invaluable factor in 
promoting public innovations in the face of the growing complexity of public policy problems, and 
comprehensive empirical studies support this view (Borins, 2001, 2014; Agger et al, 2015). 
Collaboration between different types of actors is valuable because it can spur the creative 
destructions of existing world views and notions of what is possible, the formulation of new 
creative ideas, ways of transforming these ideas into things that work and are diffused to relevant 
audiences. In other words, collaboration has something to offer in all the phases of an innovation 
process (Freeman, 1991; Dente, Bobbio and Spada, 2005). 
 
The degree to which collaboration leads to the development of new policy ideas, however, does not 
depend on the ability of the involved actors to reach a consensus. The ideas that emerge might result 
in contestations that cannot be overcome. Nevertheless, the new perspectives and ideas that have 
been articulated can inspire the involved actors in their on-going attempts to develop new policies 
in other contexts (Gray, 1989; Roberts and Bradley, 1991). However, a rough consensus or 
negotiated agreement is reached, collaboration can enhance the capacity for policy realization 
because it enhances the political ownership and commitment among those who have participated in 
the collaborative process in ways that accommodate the political decision making and 
implementation processes. Finally, collaboration promotes policy diffusion if it recruits interested 
parties and opinion-makers as ambassadors for a new policy innovation. An example of a policy 
innovation process where collaboration played a productive role is the transition from a welfare 
policy to workfare policy in Danish labour market policy in the 1990s (Torfing, 1999). This 
transition was a result of intensive collaboration between a wide range of public and private 
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stakeholders. Collaboration can also sometimes block policy innovation if some of the participating 
actors lack the motivation to question existing policies and ways of working in political life. This 
danger is considerable in the case of weak political leadership (Roberts and King, 1996) or if there 
are few pressures to develop new policy programs due to a low level of political competition 
(Bullinger et al., 2010).            
 
In conclusion, policy innovation is driven by a combination of political leadership, competition and 
collaboration (Hartley, Sørensen and Torfing, 2013). Political leadership and political competition 
that spur collaboration are decisive for promoting policy innovation, and so are collaborative 
endeavours and competitive procedures that motivate political leaders to call for political change. 
Political leaders with the courage and incentives to launch new political ideas developed in 
collaborative policy arenas can also trigger efforts to innovate policies among opposition parties 
and other political actors who experience that they are losing the political initiative. It is a difficult 
task, however, to design the right configuration of innovation drivers for democratic policy making. 
If the level of political competition becomes too fierce there is no willingness to collaborate, but if 
the competitive pressures are weak, the political actors will have few incentives to put policy 
innovation on the political agenda. In that case both political leaders and collaborative arenas will 
tend to contend themselves with the status quo. Therefore, the policy innovation capacity of 
representative democracies depend, to a considerable extent, on the extent to which public 
authorities take on the task as designers of productive conditions for policy innovation.    
 
 
Barriers to policy innovation in traditional models of representative democracy 
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In light of the above call for a combination of the three drivers of policy innovation, it must be 
considered to what extent and how the political systems in Western liberal democracies provide 
such a balance. At a general level of analysis, I find that the formal policy making structure and the 
cultural images and role perceptions advocated by mainstream models of representative democracy 
favour political leadership and competition more than collaboration. Empirical studies show, 
however, that political life in Western liberal democracies involves a high degree of more or less 
informal interaction between political, administrative and social elites (Lindblom, 1965; Schmitter, 
1974). The informal character of these interactions, the fact that they tend to involve political, 
administrative and social elites rather than relevant and affected stakeholders, and that the purpose 
tends to be bargaining rather than collaborative policy innovation, indicate that there is a 
considerable potential for enhancing policy innovation in representative democracies by improving 
the conditions for collaboration between politicians and relevant and affected stakeholders. 
Therefore, we need to clarify to what extent and how the establishment of arenas for collaborative 
policy making can enhance the policy innovation capacity of representative democracy. In 
answering this question, first step is to identify some of the potential barriers to policy innovation in 
models of representative government. These barriers are summarized in table 2.      
 
Policy barriers Organizational and 
procedural barriers  
Political culture barriers   
Policy contents focus on 
authoritative regulations 
rather than on mobilizing the 
problem solving capacity of 
Policy making is mostly 
organized as an in-house 
activity that only involves 
politicians and administrators  
Traditional cultural 
images of how policy 




relevant social actors  
 
Policy formats rarely target 
those street level bureaucrats 
and citizens who are to 
implement the policy  
 
If external actors are involved 
they tend to be participating 
at a very late stage in the 
policy process 
 




politicians as solitary 
policy makers  
Table 2: Potential barriers to policy innovation  
 
In representative democracies politicians and other public authorities tend to focus policy contents 
on what they themselves can do to solve policy problems. At national levels of governance, policies 
often consist in passing new laws and regulatory rules and allocating funding. As a consequence, 
the format of new policies is often technical in kind and directed towards regulators such as lawyers 
and policy designers designed to inform stakeholders such as street level bureaucrats and affected 
publics. This approach to policy making is increasingly problematic because it fails to take into 
account the increasing de-statification of policy making that is driven by a growing complexity the 
policy problems that are on the political agenda (Jessop, 2004). Examples are global warming, the 
growth in lifestyle related illnesses, and immigration problems. Many of these problems can only be 
solved through the mobilization of the resources and energies of a wide range of social actors, and 
policies that in content and format fail to mobilize these actors are likely to fail. 
 
When policy making is mostly organized as an in-house activity among politicians and 
administrators at national and local levels of governance, there is little room and occasion for 
dialogue, knowledge exchange and collaboration between politicians and relevant and affected 
stakeholders (Carstensen and Bason, 2012). It should be noted that most representative democracies 
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do have mechanisms that allow external actors to contribute to policy innovation. At national levels 
of governance, Expert Commissions and Think Tanks provide policy recommendations and at local 
levels of governance user boards and local citizen committees are sometimes involved in policy 
innovation (Mayo and Hollander, 1991; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006). However, since politicians are 
rarely directly involved in these policy innovation debates, they often end up selecting 
recommendations that fit their pre-given policy positions, or fail to hear about the outcomes of these 
debates. There are also hearings that allow relevant interest groups and institutions to comment on 
new political reform programs but their comments arrive at a late stage in the political process 
where the politicians have already committed themselves to a certain view point, or a negotiated 
agreement has been made and cannot be undone without huge political costs.  
 
Deeply engrained in the political culture of representative democracies is that there should be a safe 
distance between public authorities and relevant and affected social actors. The purpose is twofold: 
to ensure that politicians and public administrators do not fall victim to pressures from strong 
private interests (Sartori, 1987), and to protect civil society actors from being co-opted by public 
authorities (Bang, 2003). This fear of clientilism and totalitarianism has resulted in a tendency to 
stigmatize all forms of interaction between politicians and relevant and affected stakeholders rather 
than institutionalizing it in ways that strengthen the legitimacy and governance capacity of the 
political elites and accommodates collaborative policy innovation. The role perceptions in 
traditional models of representative democracy represent another cultural barrier to collaborative 
policy innovation. Politicians are portrayed as sovereign rulers with sufficient capacity and full 
responsibility for developing new innovative policies while bureaucrats and seen as rule and order 
following policy implementers, and citizens, private businesses and voluntary organizations are 
passive recipients of policy solutions (Torfing et al., 2012). These role images overlook the fact that 
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politicians are rarely in a position to define and solve policy problems on their own and that 
collaboration with relevant and affected stakeholder could enhance their capacity to develop new 
innovative political visions, goals and strategies that are able to produce added value.    
 
 
Lessons from experiments promoting collaboration in policy innovation 
Studies of experiments seeking to promote collaborative policy innovation between politicians and 
relevant and affected stakeholders appear as a promising way of clarifying to what extent the 
introduction of collaborative governance arenas can contribute to promoting policy innovation by 
shifting the balance between political leadership, competition and collaboration. We see a surge of 
such experiments in Denmark. Most of them take place in the municipalities but some are also 
found at the national level of government. Two of these experiments are particularly interesting in 
this context. First of all, their specific purpose is to develop new problem definitions and policy 
solutions by bringing together relevant and affected stakeholders. Second, rather than staying at an 
arms-length distance as is often the case, a number of politicians are directly involved in the 
collaboration process. Third, the experiments provide amble time and space for comprehensive 
collaboration. Finally, it seems relevant to choose a case of local and national policy innovation, 
respectively because it allows for considerations regarding differences in the conditions for policy 
innovation at different levels of government. The two case studies will first of all clarify if the 
collaborative governance arenas succeeded in developing a new innovative policy content and 
policy format. Moreover, I will analyse how the collaborative policy arenas contributed to 
overcoming some of the barriers to policy innovation described earlier. Finally, I discuss to what 
extent the experiments managed to establish a productive balance between political leadership, 
17 
 
competition and collaboration, and whether differences between the conditions at local and national 
levels of government can explain differences between the two cases.  
 
Collaborative policy innovation in Albertslund Municipality 
In 2010, Albertslund municipality initiated a project aiming to develop a new innovative citizen 
involvement policy through the establishment a collaborative policy arena. A colleague and I 
observed the process from beginning to end over a two year period. The data consisted of 
observations of meetings and other events, document studies and research interviews with the 
involved actors. The study is reported in detail elsewhere (Agger and Sørensen, 2014). The project 
was initiated by the City Council who decided to form an ad hoc committee composed of six 
politicians, six citizens and three public administrators as an alternative to developing the policy in 
a standing political committee, which was normal practice. The committee was given one year to 
prepare a policy proposal. 
 
In the course of this time, the committee managed to develop an innovative policy content that 
redefined the overall purpose of citizen involvement in Albertslund. Emphasis was put on citizen 
involvement as a means to innovate public policy and services rather than as a toll for enhancing 
democracy. The new innovative policy content was relatively vague, however, and took the form of 
a broad political vision rather than a commitment to concrete political goals and strategies. Also the 
policy format way innovated so as to reach new audiences that the public authorities themselves. It 
took the form of a short policy pamphlet that rephrased the problem definition and aim that was 
originally commissioned. The policy pamphlet was formulated in a language suited for broad 
distribution among municipal employees and citizens and it was supplemented by videos of 
interviews with citizens about the benefits of citizen involvement. In addition, a manual was 
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produced describing methods for citizen involvement to be used by the employees. The 
organizational set up and procedures used in the process also took new forms. Instead of running a 
series of traditional meetings with a fixed agenda and structured debates between the members, the 
committee decided to invite different policy experts to their meeting and to host an innovation 
camps and a workshop with relevant and affected stakeholders in addition, and minutes were 
exchanged with mind maps. As a result of this new way of working, the relationship and role 
perceptions of the participating citizens, politicians and administrators gradually changed. The 
citizens began to see the municipal actors as collaboration partners and themselves as capable co-
producers of policy ideas. The politicians on their side found that they could develop new ideas in 
discussion with citizens and other relevant stakeholders, and found that this was more satisfactory 
than defending fixed policy positions. Also the administrators redefined their role positions. They 
gradually changed from controllers to participants in the discussions. The politicians in the City 
Council were invited to participate in the innovation camp that was held half way through the 
process. When the work ended,, the ad hoc committee presented the policy proposal at two 
meetings in the City Council, and the proposal was passed without changes. The on-going 
communication over the one and a half years the policy innovation process lasted can contribute to 
explaining the low level of conflict and dispute in the City Council when the new policy was 
passed.  
 
Collaborative policy innovation in The Ethical Council 
In 2011 a Danish think-tank called The Ethical Council, initiated a collaborative policy innovation 
process aiming to develop policy advice to the Danish parliament regarding how to reduce the use 
of force in psychiatric treatment. A colleague and I observed the one year long policy process. In 
line with the Albertslund study, the data included observations of meetings and other events, 
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document studies and research interviews with the involved actors (See Sørensen and Waldorff, 
2014 for more detail). The Ethical Council was formed by the Danish national parliament in 1987, 
and the goal was to advise the Danish Parliament on policy matters involving ethical dilemmas 
related to science. The Council is headed by a board appointed by the parliament and different 
ministries. The Board wanted to spur more interest in the policy advice they gave among the 
politicians as well as among other relevant and affected stakeholders, which they found increasingly 
difficult. The basic idea was to bring politicians and relevant and affected stakeholders together in a 
shared effort to map and explain the use of force in the treatment of psychiatric patients and to 
suggest ways to reduce it. The experimental policy process led to the formulation of an innovative 
policy content and form, a new organizational and procedural set up for policy making, and new 
role perceptions among the involved actors.  
 
The content of the policy that was developed was innovative in the sense that it rejected the existing 
hegemonic idea that the use of force in psychiatric treatment was resulting from financial 
constraints and insufficient legal regulation. It was concluded that use of force was primarily a 
product of the culture in psychiatric institutions, and efforts to change things should therefore seek 
to change the culture. Moreover, a new policy format was developed. The Ethical Council 
concluded that the new innovative problem definition and policy suggestions increased the 
importance of reaching a broad variety of relevant and affected stakeholders such as the patients 
and employees in psychiatric care as well as the politicians. Therefore, the traditional policy brief 
was supplemented with easy to read folders and videos that were distributed to the employees in 
psychiatric care. The Ethical Council also changed its organizational set up and procedures for this 
particular occasion. Normally the Council developed policy proposals in the secretariat based on 
discussions between the Board members, and only now and then did they invite input from external 
20 
 
actors, but this time they decided to hire a private consultancy firm that specialized in the use of 
theatre workshops. This firm took on the task of organizing three theatre workshops and a closing 
conference to be held at the Danish parliament. The four events were planned at a series of meetings 
between the firm and selected members of the Ethical Council. An increasing number of relevant 
and affected stakeholders were invited to participate in the three workshops starting with 15 and 
ending with 50 participants. 200 people including politicians, employees, patients and relatives and 
their organizations, attended the final conference. Although it is difficult to assess how much the 
innovation process affected the cultural images and role perceptions of the involved stakeholders, 
the process definitely affected the way of thinking within The Ethical Council. From having a 
scientific expert oriented approach to ethical questions, they began to view stakeholder experiences 
as relevant and valuable in considering ethical predicaments. After the closing conference the staff 
in the Ethical Council  wrote a policy brief that was to be presented at a meeting in a relevant 
Parliamentary Committee. Much to the frustration of the Ethical Council this meeting was cancelled 
because very few politicians showed up, and the policy brief ended of having very limited effect on 
parliamentary policy making.   
  
Similarities and differences between the two cases 
Then, what have we learned about the potential impact that collaboration between politicians and 
stakeholders on policy innovation form the two experiments? Both studies show that collaboration 
can indeed contribute to the development of new policies and policy formats as well as to the 
development of new organizational, procedural and cultural innovations in political life. Moreover, 
however, the studies reveal a number of innovation barriers. In Albertslund the policy that was 
passed on to the City Council was very vague and is more correctly described as a policy vision 
than as a new innovative policy that provide added value in society by committing the politicians to 
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realize specific political goals and strategies. The Ethical Council ended up with the problem that 
they failed to communicate the content of the new policy to the politicians, and again the policy 
innovation stranded at the stage of moving from innovative idea to realization.  
 
Why did both experiments fail in transforming new innovative policy ideas developed through 
collaborative policy innovation between politicians and stakeholders into new political goals and 
strategies? The cause is to be fund in a failure to establish a productive balance between political 
leadership, competition and collaboration. In Albertslund the level of political leadership was well 
dosed. The City Council and the participating politicians functioned as convenors, facilitators and 
catalysts throughout the collaboration process, and the City Council was involved at regular 
intervals. The exercise of political leadership was also ensured because the mayor had the necessary 
NATO-resources to guide and steer the process. In comparison, very limited space was allowed for 
political competition between the different political parties in the City Council as well as in the 
collaboration process. The general idea was that disagreements between the parties should be kept 
off the agenda, and that prevented the politicians form testing their ideas and develop new 
viewpoints that took their political perspectives into account. As a result, the policy outcome did not 
really create changes in the political goals and strategies pursued by the individual parties in the 
City Council. This effort to seek consensus and suppress competition is most likely related to the 
fact that the experiment was carried out at the local level of governance in Denmark where 
consensus tends to be more dominant than at the national levels of government. 
 
In the Ethical Council case, the level of conflict in the collaboration process was generally high. 
Raging verbal battles took place not only between different stakeholder groups but also between 
stakeholders and politicians and between politicians form different parties. These contestations 
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contributed to creating creative destructions and the development of new ideas and little was done 
to create consensus. The weak point in this policy innovation process was a profound lack of 
political leadership that meant that neither the parliament nor the participating politicians felt any 
ownership of and/or responsibility for the fate of the policy outcome. The project was initiated by 
the Ethical Council and the role as convenor, facilitator and catalyst was performed by a 
consultancy firm. Moreover, none of the participating politicians possessed the NATO-resources 
needed to carry the new policy ideas into the parliamentary process with any strength. Ensuring 
strong political leadership of collaborative policy innovation processes is likely to be particularly 
difficult at the national level of governance because politicians who are able and willing to devote 
time to engaging in close interaction with relevant and affected stakeholders over a longer period of 




Western liberal governments relentlessly seek ways to enhance the innovative capacity of the public 
sector, but there are few considerations regarding to that extent political life in Western liberal 
democracies fully exploits the available drivers of policy innovation. In this article, I have argued 
that there are a number of barriers to overcome in improving the policy innovation capacity of 
representative democracies. Barriers to policy innovation are not only found in the narrow 
perceptions of how to govern and who can govern, but also in the organizational, procedural and 
cultural political structures of representative democracy that provide ample space for political 
leadership and competition but does little to promote collaboration. The analyses of the two case 
studies indicate that an expansion of the opportunity for politicians to collaborate with relevant and 
affected actors in a shared attempt to develop new policies can contribute to promoting new 
23 
 
innovative policy ideas. The studies also show, however, that the degree to which these ideas are 
transformed into new innovative policies authorized by elected politicians depends on how the 
collaboration processes are combined with political leadership and competition. In other words, my 
message is that at the macro level those who aim to promote the policy innovation capacity of 
representative democracies must reform political life in ways that establish a productive 
combination of these three important innovation drivers. At the micro-level those designing 
concrete situated policy innovation processes must do the same in ways that take the particular 
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